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Abstract- Sensor nodes may be deployed in hostile environments. An adversary may compromise the 
sensor nodes and inject false data into the network, which wastes scarce energy resources of the 
forwarding nodes. Existing schemes can effectively resist false data injection, but most of them do not 
consider the identifiers (IDs) attack, the en-route nodes check only the Message Authentication Codes 
(MACs) and do not verify the nodes identifiers (IDs) of the endorsing reports. In this paper, we propose 
a novel security routing protocol (KCEFP) based on one-way key chain. The proposed protocol can 
resist false data injection, replay and IDs attacks, and if the endorsement report is modified, the 
forwarding nodes can verify the endorsement report by the key chain, and filters out the fabricated 
packet right now. The security and performance analysis shows that our scheme provides a high 
security level and the energy savings significantly increasing with the number of fabricated report 
packet increasing. 
 
Index terms: Wireless Sensor Networks, key chain, false data injection attack, different operation, fabricated 
packet. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of one or multiple base stations and many sensor nodes. 
In Wireless sensor networks, each sensor node will monitor the surround area to sense the 
environment conditions, and then forward these data to the base station. By the advantage of 
wireless communication, the wireless sensor network can be applied in many filed such as 
environment monitoring, health care, virtual fences, surveillance, and military [1-3].  
In many scenarios, wireless sensor networks are deployed in hostile environments, thus, secure 
communication is a very important requirement in wireless sensor network. Many scholars have 
been done much research work [12-17] on how to protect the communication security of wireless 
sensor networks. And because the computation, communication and power limitations of wireless 
sensor networks, the adversaries could easily compromise sensor nodes, and the adversary can 
inject the false data into the sensing data through the compromised nodes [4], the invalid data 
packet will be forward to the base station along the forwarding path, which can not only deceive 
the base station but also deplete the limited resource of wireless sensor networks. Furthermore, 
the adversary can launch a replay attack by sending out multiple copies of an intercepted 
legitimate report and waste the scarce energy of forwarding nodes. How to resist false data 
injection and replay attacks is very import in wireless sensor networks. 
In order to resist false data injection attack in wireless sensor networks, many scholars have been 
done much research work [5-13]. But most of them do not consider the identifiers (IDs) attack, 
the en-route nodes check only the Message Authentication Codes (MAC) and do not verify the 
nodes identifiers (IDs) of endorsing the reports, the adversary can modify the node ID list so that 
the base station is not able to verify the reports, which wastes the scarce energy resources of all 
the forwarding nodes. 
In this paper, a novel security routing protocol based on one-way key chain and different 
operation (KCEFP) is proposed. The proposed protocol (KCEFP) can resist false data injection, 
replay and IDs attacks, and if the endorsement report is modified, the forwarding nodes can 
verify the endorsement report by the key chain, and filters out the fabricated packet right now. 
The security and performance analysis shows that our scheme provides a high security level and 
the energy savings significantly increasing with the number of fabricated report packet increasing. 
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The organization of the lecture is as follows. The related work is introduced in section 2, in 
section 3 briefly introduces network model, assumptions and One-Way Hash key chain, the 
section 4 is the description of KCEFP, the security, and performance analysis of the new scheme 
are discussed in section 5 and 6, section 7 is the conclusion and further work. 
 
II.  RELATED WORK 
 
In 2004, An interleaved hop-by-hop authentication scheme for filtering of injected false data was 
proposed by Zhu et al [5], in the scheme, to defend against false data injection attacks, at least t + 
1 sensor nodes have to agree upon a report before it is sent to the base station, here the t is a 
security threshold based on the security requirements of the application under consideration and 
the network node density. Further, all the nodes that are involved in relaying the report to the 
base station authenticate the report in an interleaved, hop-by-hop fashion, any data change 
between two associated nodes was considered as false data injection. The scheme can guarantee 
that if no more than t nodes are compromised, the base station will detect any false data packets 
injected by the compromised sensors.  
In [6], A Statistical en-route filtering mechanism (SEF) was proposed by F. Ye et al to detect and 
drop false reports during the forwarding process. In SEF, a legitimate report is generated by 
multiple surrounding sensors, and the legitimate report is attached endorsement nodes’ message 
authentication codes (MACs). As a report is forwarded through multiple hops toward the sink, 
each forwarding node verifies the correctness of the MACs carried in the report with certain 
probability and drops the report if an incorrect MAC is detected. However, due to its design 
strategy, only a few intermediate nodes have the ability to check the validity of forwarding 
messages. 
In 2007, Vinod Shukla and Daji Qiao proposed a secure statistical scheme (SSTF)[7], SSTF is 
able to distinguish transient data from false data in most scenarios, in the scheme, each sensor 
computes a statistical digest of the monitored phenomenon over a moving window of recent 
readings and reports this digest along with the current reading to CH. By utilizing the statistical 
digests to aid in decision making and data aggregation at the CH. But if only the current sensed 
readings are reported by individual sensors, it is very difficult to distinguish transient data from 
false data, and SSTF requires the CH to perform a series of carefully-designed inter-sensor tests 
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on both readings and digests reported by individual sensors, which increases the burden of the 
CH. 
Ren Kui et al proposed a security End-to-end data transient scheme (LEDS) [8], in the LEDS, a 
location-aware end-to-end security framework is proposed, in which each node only stores a few 
secret keys and those secret keys are bound to the node’s geographic location. This location-
aware property successfully limits the impact of compromised nodes only to their vicinity 
without affecting end-to-end data security. LEDS could guarantee efficient en-route bogus data 
filtering and is highly robust against many know DoS attacks by one-to-many data delivery 
approach, but the scheme requires each node must know location information of the node.  
Ozdemir.Suat et al proposed a data aggregation and authentication protocol (DAA)[9], the DAA 
could provide false data detection and secure data aggregation against up to T compromised 
sensor nodes. To detect false data injected by a data aggregator while performing data 
aggregation, some neighboring nodes of the data aggregator (called monitoring nodes) also 
perform data aggregation and compute message authentication codes (MACs) for the aggregated 
data to enable their pair mates to verify the data later. DAA also provides data confidentiality as 
data are forwarded between data aggregators. To provide data confidentiality during data 
forwarding between every two consecutive data aggregators, the aggregated data are encrypted at 
data aggregators, and false data detection is performed over the encrypted data rather than the 
plain data. Whenever the verification of encrypted data fails at a forwarding node, the data are 
dropped immediately to minimize the waste of resources such as bandwidth and battery power 
due to false data injection. 
Yu et al. proposes a grouping-based resilient statistical en-route filtering scheme (GRSEF) for 
filtering false data [10]. GRSEF divide sensor nodes into T groups, which ensure any position in 
the monitoring area can be covered simultaneously by T nodes from distinct groups with high 
probability, and GRSEF introduces a multi-axis division technique to tackle the threshold 
limitation without relying on the sink stationarity and routing mechanism. GRSEF efficiently 
avoids introducing redundant groups and achieves the independence on the sink stationarity and 
routing protocols, but each sensor node stores a large number of keys, and the adversary only 
need compromise small amount nodes which can make the security protocol failure. 
In [11], geographical information based false reports filtering scheme (GFFS) in sensor networks 
was proposed by Z. LIU and J. WANG. After deployment, each node sends its location 
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information to other nodes. The legitimate sensing report must carry not only MACs from t 
detecting nodes with distinct key partitions, but also locations of these nodes. Each en-node 
checks not only the correctness of the MAC and the locations carried in the report, but also the 
legitimacy of the locations. The scheme can resist collaborative false data injection attacks, but, 
obtaining the geographical information of the node depletes the sensor nodes resources. 
 In the schemes[5] [6] [8] [11]can resist false data injection and PDoS attacks, but do not consider 
the identifiers(IDs) attack, the en-route nodes check only the Message Authentication 
Codes(MAC) and do not verify the nodes identifiers(IDs) of endorsing the reports. the adversary 
can modify the node ID list so that the base station is not able to verify the reports, which wastes 
the scarce energy resources of all the forwarding nodes, the adversary can modify the node ID list 
so that the base station is not able to verify the reports, which wastes the scarce energy resources 
of all the forwarding nodes. 
 
III. NETWORK MODEL, ASSUMPTIONS AND ONE-WAY HASH KEY CHAIN  
 
a. Network Model 
We consider that the wireless sensor network consists of a base station (BS) and a large amount 
of sensor nodes. The sensor nodes are grouped into distinct clusters after deployment. There are 
many clustering algorithm in wireless sensor networks [18-19], we use the cluster algorithm 
similar to that used in scheme [19]. Once an event occurs in an area, it can be detected by many 
nodes in the cluster covering the area. We assume that the neighbor nodes can sense the same 
message. In each cluster, the cluster head (CH) collects the message receives from the detecting 
nodes and generates a final report, the final report is then forwarded to the base station. 
b. Assumptions 
We assume that nodes are limited in their storage, computational, and communication resource, 
the base station is not resource constrained, and is assumed to be uncompromised at all times. It 
is assumed that an adversary can launch many attacks. If a sensor node is compromised, all the 
information it holds will be known to the adversary, and the adversary can use the compromised 
node to inject false reports into the network, which will deceive the base station and deplete the 
resources of the forwarding nodes. The adversary can perform a replay attack by sending out 
multiple copies of an intercepted legitimate report. Furthermore the adversary can launch the 
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identifiers (IDs) attack; the adversary can modify the node ID list so that the base station is not 
able to verify the reports, which wastes the scarce energy resources of all the forwarding nodes. 
c. One-Way Hash key chain 
A one-way function H which maps an arbitrary length message M to a fixed-length hash value D, 
it is a public function easy to compute but computationally infeasible to revert, Given M and 
H(M) it is hard to find a message M’≠M such that H(M’)==H(M). 
The one-way hash key chain [6] is constructed by repeatedly applying the one-way hash function 
H, on a random seed number R for m times. For example, if let Km=R, then Km-1= H(Km)=H1(R) , 
Km-2= H(Km-1)=H2(R), …, K1= H(K2)=Hm-1(R), K0= H(K1)=Hm(R), the last hashed output(K0) is 
called committed value of hash chain. So we have K0 = Hm(Km) =Hm(R). Given an existing 
authenticated element of a one-way hash chain, it can verify elements later in the sequence of use 
within the chain. For example, given authenticated Ki value, a node can authenticate Ki+3 by 
computing H (H (H (Ki+3))) and verifying that the resulting value equals Ki. 
 
IV.    DESCRIPTION OF KCEFP 
 
a. Notations 
We assume that the nodes send message to the base station according to the base station’s query 
message. Since many notations are used in our proposed protocol, in order to easy to inquire, 
compare and reference, we list the notations used in proposed protocol in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Notations of proposed protocol 
 
Notation Definition 
R One big prime 
H(.) A collision-resistant one-way hash function 
IDi The identity of the node i 
BS The base station 
CHi the cluster head i 
Si the node i 
Ki,BS The secret key shared between the node i and base station 
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KCHi,BS The secret key shared between base station and the cluster head i 
E(K,M) A message M encrypted with the key k 
MAC Message Authentication Codes 
QUERYID An unique query identity from base station to sensor node 
T A timestamp 
|| The concatenation operation 
⊕  Exclusive or operation 
 
The proposed protocol consists of five phases: System Deployment and Initialization, Query 
from base station, Report collection and generation, En-route filtering, and Verification. 
b. System Deployment and Initialization 
1)  The system randomly selects a number IDi as the unique identity of the node i. 
2)  Each sensor node saves a secret key shared between the node i and base station. 
3)   Each sensor node saves a collision-resistant one-way hash function. 
4)  The system deploys the sensor nodes to the target area. 
5)  After deploying, the sensor nodes are grouped into clusters, and a cluster head (CH) is elected 
in each cluster. 
c. Query from base station 
When the base station wants to get some message from the cluster i, it sends a query message to 
the cluster head i as following: 
1)  The base station selects randomly a big prime R as Km from the finite field. 
2)   The base station computes the Km-1= H(Km)=H1(R). 
3)  The base station generates the query message packet, <QUERYID, Km-1, E(KCHi,BS, 
Q||m||R||T) >, and sends this packet to the CHi. The Q denotes the query message and m denotes 
the hops between the base station and CHi. 
4)  After receiving the query message packet, the fist hop intermediate node stores the 
(QUERYID, Km-1 ) to the memory. 
5)  And computes Km-2= H(Km-1)=H2(R), and generates the new query message packet, 
<QUERYID, Km-2, E(KCHi,BS, Q||m||R||T) >, and sends this packet to the next hop intermediate 
node. 
6)  When the intermediate node i receives the query message packet, it stores the (QUERYID, 
Km-i ) to the memory, and computes Km-i-1= H(Km-i), and generates the new query message packet, 
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<QUERYID, Km-i-1, E(KCHi,BS, Q||m||R||T)>, and sends this packet to the next hop intermediate 
node. For example, in Figure.1, the hops m is 5 between the BS and CHi, and the hash keys 
stored in node S1 , S2, S3, S3 and CHi are K4= H1(R), K3= H2(R), K2= H3(R), K1= H4(R), K0= 
H5(R). 
 
 
Figure 1. An example of the one-way hash key stored in the forwarding node, and the hash key 
computing in response phase 
d. Report Collection and Generation 
1)   When the CHi receives the query message packet <QUERYID, K0, E(KCHi,BS, Q||m||R||T)>, it 
decrypts the message E(KCHi,BS, Q||m||R||T) by the secret key KCHi,bs, if the T is under the 
reasonable ranges, the CHi will generates the report RP according to the query message Q. 
2)   The CHi sends the RP and the query message Q to his member nodes i (i=1…n), n denotes 
the number of member nodes. 
3)   After receiving the message, each the member node i generates a report RP’ according to the 
query message Q and checks if the RP’ == RP, if yes, the node i calculates MACi =E(Ki,bs, RP), 
and sends the MACi and the identity of the node i  IDi to the CHi. 
Si→CHi: < MACi, IDi > 
4)   After collection at least t+1 endorsements of the report RP from his member nodes, the CHi 
randomly selects t endorsements form the received endorsements, and calculates SMAC= 
MACCH⊕  MAC1…⊕MACt = E(KCHi,bs, RP) ⊕E(K1,bs, RP)…⊕E(Kt,bs, RP). 
5)   Set m’=1, and comuptes MAC= E (K0, IDCHi||ID1||…||IDt||SMAC). 
6)  The CHi generates report packet <(QUERYID, m’, IDCHi, ID1 ,…, IDt), SMAC, MAC, 
E(KCHi,bs, RP||T’)>, and sends this packet  to the base station along the reversed query message 
path, when the packet is forwarded one time, set m’=m’+1. 
CHi→BS: <(QUERYID, m’, IDCHi, ID1 ,…, IDt), SMAC, MAC, E(KCHi,bs, RP||T’)> 
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e. En-route Filtering 
When all intermediate nodes receive the report packet, each intermediate node performers the 
step as following: 
1)  Each intermediate node i check if it has stored the unique identity QUERYID, if not, the 
packet will be dropped.  
2) Otherwise, the intermediate node i get Ki from the its memory, and calculates the one-way 
hash key on Ki by repeatedly applying the one-way hash function H m’ times, and get the hash 
key Ki’=Hm’(Ki)= K0. For example, in fig.1, the hops m is 5 between the BS and CHi, the node S4 
get the value m’=1, and computes K1’=Hm’(Ki)= H1(K1)= H1(H4(R))= H5(R)= K0. 
3) the intermediate node i comuptes MAC’= E(Ki’, IDCHi||ID1||…||IDt||SMAC) with the Ki’, IDCHi, 
ID1 ,…, IDt , and SMAC. 
4) the intermediate node i verify if the MAC’= = MAC, if not, the packet will be dropped, 
because the m’, IDCHi, ID1 ,…, IDt , or SMAC is modified by adversary. 
5)  Otherwise, the intermediate node i forwards the report packet to the next intermediate node, 
and deletes the (QUERYID, Ki) from its memory.  
f. BS Verification 
After receiving the report packet form the CHi, the BS will verify the valid of the report RP as 
following: 
1) The BS decrypts the message E(KCHi,bs, RP||T’) by the secret key KCHi,bs, gets RP and T’. If the 
T’ is out of the reasonable ranges, BS will drop the report packet. 
2)  The BS looks up the secret keys KCHi,bs, K1,bs,…, and Kt,bs according to the IDCHi, ID1 ,…, and 
IDt, which shared between the node i and base station. 
3) The BS computes SMAC’=E(KCHi,bs, RP) ⊕E(K1,bs, RP)…⊕E(Kt,bs, RP) with the share key 
KCHi,bs, K1,bs,…, Kt,bs between the nodes and the base station. 
4) The BS checks if SMAC’= = SMAC, if yes, BS receives the report packet, otherwise, BS 
drops the report packet. 
 
V. THE SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
a. Data Confidentiality 
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When the outside adversary obtains the report packet of the CHi sends to the base station, it can 
get SMAC and E(KCHi,bs, RP||T2) , but it has no the secret share keys K1,bs,…, Kt,bs, and  
KCHi,bs, it can not decrypt the message E(KCHi,bs, RP||T’) and SMAC, and can not obtain the 
report RP, so this scheme can ensures data confidentiality. 
b. Resilience against false data injection attack 
When the outside adversary obtains the report packet <(QUERYID, m’, IDCHi, ID1 ,…, IDt), 
SMAC, MAC, E(KCHi,bs, RP||T’)>, it can not modify any message of the report packet to deceive 
the base station, because it has no the secret share keys K1,bs,…, Kt,bs, and  KCHi,bs,  between the 
nodes i, CHi and the base station.  
If the adversary compromises less than t nodes, t denotes the number of the CHi member nodes. 
The compromised node i can generate a false data MACi’, and sends (MACi’, IDi) to CHi, the 
CHi will generate SMAC’, and sends report packet to the base station, it will be detected after the 
base station carries out verification algorithm. 
c. Resilience against identifiers (IDs) attack 
In the schemes [5] [6] [8] [11] can resist false data injection attacks but do not consider the 
identifiers (IDs) attack. In these schemes, the en-route nodes do not check the identifiers of the 
sensor nodes endorsing the reports, only the BS can verify the node identifiers, which make the 
adversary can simply modify the node identifiers list, and the BS can not correctly verify the 
report packet. To fight again identifiers (IDs) attack, in our scheme, the node identifiers are 
included in the MAC contents, each intermediate node i verify if the MAC’= = MAC, if not, the 
packet will be dropped, because the m’, IDCHi, ID1 ,…, IDt , or SMAC is modified by adversary. 
d. Resilience against replay attack 
In the query from BS phase, each intermediate nodes i store the (QUERYID, Ki) to the memory, 
and the intermediate nodes will delete the (QUERYID, Ki) after the report packet is forwarded or 
the report packet does not arrive within a certain period of time. After receiving a report packet, 
each intermediate node i will check if it has stored the unique identity QUERYID, if not, the 
packet will be dropped, so the adversary can not launch the replay attack by sending multiple 
copies of legitimate report packet.  
 
VI. THE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
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a. Storage Requirements 
In this part, we show storage requirements. We assume that the base station has unlimited 
computation ability and storage, we do not consider the memory cost of the base station. 
In our scheme, each sensor node must save the node’s own identity IDi and Ki,BS to his memory 
in System deployment and initialization phase. Each node needs save (QUERYID, Ki)  to his 
memory in the phase of query from base station. Let LID, Lkey, LQUERYID, and LKi denote the 
length of the node identity, Ki,BS, QUERYID and Ki. The storage requirements RS for a sensor 
node are: RS= LID+ Lkey+LQUERYID+LKi, suppose the length of a node identity and LQUERYID is 10 
bits, the length of hash value and the security key is 64bits, the storage requirements RS for a 
sensor node is RS=10+64+10+64=148Bits=18.5bytes. 
In[5], each nodes needs store the share key Ku between node u and the base station, the share pair 
wise key Kuv  between nodes u and v, node u’s authentication key Kua  , and the id list of cluster 
acknowledgment. Let LID, and t denote the length of a node identity and the node identifiers 
numbers in the id list. Let Lkey  denotes the length of Ku, Kuv  and Kua.The storage requirements 
RS’ for a sensor node are: RS’= t*LID+ 3*Lkey, suppose the length of a node identity is 10 bits, 
the length of the security key is 64bits, the node identifiers numbers is 10, the storage 
requirements RS’ for a sensor node is RS’=10*10+3*64=292Bits=36.5bytes. 
In [8], each nodes needs store two unique secret keys shared between the node and the sink and 
used to provide node-to-sink authentication, a cell key shared with other nodes in the same cell, a 
set of authentication keys shared with the nodes in its report-auth cells, and each sensor node is 
preloaded with the following bootstrapping parameters before network deployment:{KIM,KIIM, l, 
(x0, y0), (t, T), p}. KIM,KIIM denote two master secret keys, l and (x0, y0) denote and cell size l and 
reference point (x0, y0), The three parameters T, t, and p denote the number of endorsements 
included in an event report, the minimum number of endorsements to validate an event report, 
and a large prime. Let Lkey , m denotes the length of secret keys and the node numbers in its 
report-auth cells, let Ll, Lx,y, Lt, LT, Lp denote the length of l, (x0, y0), (t, T), p. The storage 
requirements RS’’ for a sensor node are: RS’’= 3*Lkey+m* Lkey+ Ll+Lx,y,+Lt+LT+Lp. suppose m 
is 10, the length of the security key and Lp are 64bits, the length of Ll, Lx,y , Lt, and LT are 10bits, 
the storage requirements RS’’ for a sensor node is 
RS’’=3*64+10*64+4*10+64=936Bits=117bytes. 
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The requirement analysis shows that the storage requirement of our scheme is lower than others 
schemes. 
b. Energy Consumption 
In this part, we will analysis the energy consumption of our scheme and the other scheme. We 
use the analysis model similar to that used in scheme [6]. Let t denotes the number of the sensor 
nodes endorsing the reports, let LID, LQUERYID, Lm’, LM denote the length of the node identity, the 
QUERYID, the m’ value and MAC, let LE denote the length of a report by encrypted. In our 
scheme, energy consumption of sensor nodes mainly is to receive and send the report packet. The 
format of the report packet is <(QUERYID, m’, IDCHi, ID1 ,…, IDt), SMAC, MAC, E(KCHi,bs, 
RP||T’)>. So, the length of a report packet is L= LQUERYID+ Lm + LID*t +2*LM+ LE. When a 
intermediate node receives a report packet from another node, a fabricated report packet will be 
drop after verifying, and the legitimate report packet will be forwarded, thus, the energy 
consumption in our scheme is Et=n*(L *(er+es)+ev)+m*(L*(er)+ev), where n, m denote the 
average number of hops and the number of fabricated report packet, the er,es, denote the energy 
consumption of receiving and sending 1 byte report packet, the ev denotes the energy 
consumption of  MAC computation to verify a report packet. Without our scheme, all the packet, 
include the legitimate and fabricated packet, will be forwarded to the base station along all the 
hops, let the Lr=24bytes denotes the length of a regular report, therefore, the energy consumption 
without our scheme is Er= n* Lr *(er+es)(1+m). 
c. Simulation 
We deployed randomly 2500 sensor nodes in an area of 100m×100m, it assumed that the 
sensors can not move after deploying. We set the number of fabricated report packet from 1 to 10, 
and let n=50, t=5, er=12.5µJ, es=16.25µJ, ev=15µJ, LQUERYID=10Bits, Lm’=10Bits, LM=64Bits, 
LID=10Bits, LE=64Bits. In figure 2, it depicts the energy consumption for report packet 
forwarding with the number of fabricated report packet increasing with and without our scheme. 
The figure2 also gives the result of SEF [6] with the number of fabricated report packet 
increasing. 
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Figure 2.  The energy consumption of SEF, our scheme and without our scheme 
 
In figure2, it shows that our scheme is more efficient in energy savings than SEF with the number 
of fabricated report packet increasing, and it shows that our scheme starts to save energy when 
the amount of fabricated report packet exceeds the one report packet, and with the number of 
fabricated report packet increasing, the energy savings significantly increasing also. For example, 
when m=3, our scheme saves 1- Et/Er≌64.4% of energy than the scheme without using our 
scheme. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we presented a false data injection-resilient security routing protocol based on one-
way key chain and different operation. We introduced a lightweight Encryption system one-way 
key chain which is applied in resource constrained wireless sensor networks. Each en-route nodes 
can verify the report packet through checking the validity of the one-way hash key value, if the 
hash key value is invalid, the false report packet can be filtered out immediately. The security and 
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performance analysis shows that our scheme can resist false data injection, replay and IDs attacks, 
and the storage requirement is lower than the others scheme. Furthermore, the energy savings 
significantly increasing with the number of fabricated report packet increasing.  
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